Oil Infrastructure and Terrorism – Part II
Yesterday’s New York Times contained a story that depicts the vulnerability of the U.S. military’s fuel supply chain:
U.S. Military Orders Less Dependence on Fossil Fuels
In Iraq and Afghanistan, the huge truck convoys that haul fuel to bases have been sitting ducks for enemy fighters — in the latest attack, oil tankers carrying fuel for NATO troops in Afghanistan were set on fire in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, early Monday. In Iraq and Afghanistan, one Army study found, for every 24 fuel convoys that set out, one soldier or civilian engaged in fuel transport was killed. In the past three months, six Marines have been wounded guarding fuel runs in Afghanistan.
Also, as an update to the link I posted leading off Part I of this series, 25 tankers transporting fuel to NATO forces in Afghanistan were attacked today in Pakistan, killing one of the drivers. This is the sixth attack on Afghan-bound supply convoys in just the past week.
Just as the fuel convoys are vulnerable, so are the pipelines and tankers that move oil around the world. Part II of this week’s three-part series on oil infrastructure and terrorism continues to explore the vulnerability of oil infrastructure to terrorism. The report below was written by Donald J. Evans, a Senior Research Fellow at the International Strategic Studies Association, and was originally published in the Global Intelligence Report.
Is Hydrocarbon Man the Next Terrorist Target? – Part II of III
Guest Essay by Dr. Donald J. Evans
When will terrorist cells attack Middle East pipelines? Attacks will begin when the petroleum infrastructure satisfies target criteria. The process of target selection is complicated and constantly undergoing change. Target selection in an armed conflict between states is a science and an art, and it is equally true for terrorist groups who select their targets on the basis of many factors. While it is relatively easy to imagine and theorize about factors that enter into target selection, the dynamics among and between non-state actors and selection factors is complicated, fast moving, and stealthy like terrorists themselves.
Contrary to popular opinion, terrorists are not free to do anything they want. Every potential target is not available to every terrorist cell, and these cells face a number of constraints. Pipelines themselves are complicated systems. Terrorists may simply lack resources to attack pipelines, although given the technical sophistication of today’s transnational terrorists, the resource criterion does not appear to be much of an impediment to action.
Furthermore, protection of pipelines has high priority among oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, and damage is quickly repaired. Also, other targets, such as civilians, may be of more interest to terrorists than are pipelines. Media impact is frequently crucial in the thinking of terrorists. Destruction of remote pipelines may not make the evening news on CNN for any number of reasons. Terrorists with the objective of making a statement to the world would probably not want to risk not having their activities reported, especially in countries where state control of media exists. Other constraints with examples are international opinion (UN, OPEC), security environment (Saudi Arabia National Guard-SANG, NATO), protective measures (electronic, number of control valves), current situation (FBI teams, diplomacy of sponsoring state), and leadership (planning and organization).
Oil pipelines in the Middle East may not be targets for terrorists because they are selected out during the target selection process.
Global Target Incidents
Of the five categories of transnational threats — transnational crime, transnational terrorism, international migration flows, disease and international pandemics, and global environmental degradation and climate change — the focus here is on terrorism. It is not as though terrorists avoided pipelines elsewhere around the world. In the year 2000, Latin America alone experienced 193 attacks, up from 121 the previous year. There were 10 oil related, significant, terrorist incidents: Colombia, four; Indonesia, one; and Nigeria, five. The four pipeline incidents were all in Colombia. What lies behind the four “incidents” in Colombia is the fact that Colombia’s second-largest crude oil pipeline, the Cano-Limon Covenas, was attacked 152 times. This record number of attacks was blamed on the National Liberation Army, one of two large guerrilla groups. As a result, Occidental Petroleum halted exports through most of August and September. Terrorists in these oil-related attacks attempted to obtain funds through extortion and ransom.
All acts of violence have an element of terrorism. For this reason, the terrorist label attached to acts of violence may cloud our understanding of transnational terrorism. Aggressive acts in wartime are often termed terrorism. For example, Iraq is said to be guilty of ecological terrorism in Kuwait, when in 1991 it deliberately torched or sabotaged more than 500 Kuwaiti oil wells, storage tanks, and refineries. It dumped an estimated six-million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf, the largest oil spill ever. The oil fires were the worst ever: three- to six-million barrels of oil daily went up in smoke and flames during peak times. After visiting the area, the head of the US Environmental Protection Agency said, “If hell had a national park, it would be those burning oil fires.” Whether caused by a government leader or a terrorist, pipeline destruction is the same no matter what terminology is used to describe the perpetrator.
One or a combination of agents protects oil pipelines: (1) the oil-producing state, (2) a foreign state, (3) a multinational oil corporation, (4) a non-state armed actor, and (5) a private contractor. Non-state actors include religious movements, revolutionary insurgents, warlords, guerrilla groups, drug cartels, international criminal organizations, and mercenary forces.
Military Forces. Armed forces and public safety officials of oil producing states are the first line of defense against terrorism, but many of the Middle East countries do not have the forces to effectively protect their pipelines from terrorists or aggressor states. In such situations, the United States or another strong nation-state is relied upon to protect the economic assets of weaker oil-producing states. Protection of oil production in the Middle East is clearly within national and global security interests of the US.
The emerging tendency, if not established trend, is for nation-states to turn to military forces to deal with security threats that are transnational and not state-centered. Previously, nations in modern times deployed armed forces directly against one another, and states were expected to handle their own internal problems, such as terrorism. The recent trend will likely continue in the coming decades and is expected, if terrorist should attack oil targets in the Persian Gulf states, e.g., in Kuwait or Qatar. The US military exercise, Operation CENTRAZBAT 97, sent a message to all states in the Caspian Sea region that the US is prepared to assist the oil states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan against invasion or terrorism.
Middle East states are reluctant to have the US involved directly in their internal security affairs. One exception is US assistance to the Saudi Arabia National Guard. For some time the US has been advising and training the Guard in infantry tactics and the use of up-to-date NATO equipment. The original objective of US help was to develop Guard forces capable of handling urban disorders, border problems with Yemen, and oil field security. The Guard’s effectiveness in its oil field security mission is enhanced with airborne assets and C3I links. US policy and practice leave little doubt that United States does and will continue to assist friendly Middle East states in fighting oil pipeline terrorism.
An analysis of the threat parameters for operations other than war identified five categories of threat forces: government forces, insurgent or factional forces, terrorists, criminal organization and armed populace. What is striking about the correlation of threats with mission activities is that a large number of activities across all threat categories are or could be identified as terrorist activities and could cause massive destruction to oil pipelines. One study of energy security risks concluded that the oil logistical system in the Middle East is “indefensible by conventional military means and that the United States and its allies must find another strategy for lowering the risks of politically inspired attacks on key oil operations.”
Private Security. There are forces other than national armies to protect pipelines. Public or governmental security in the world is becoming increasingly privatized in part because of globalization and the inability of weak states to provide state security structures that protect citizens and properties. A new security paradigm is said to be emerging. These private security groups are categorized as mercenaries, private military companies, and private security companies. In many instances these categories tend to be mixed. Users of private security groups are non-state actors, governments in conflict regions and supplier countries, multilateral peacekeeping organization, humanitarian agencies, and corporations in extractive industries, for example, oil and gas. Oil corporations hire private contractors to secure their pipelines.
Financial Incentives. The financing of terror is widespread in the Middle East. In so doing, oil producing Arab states receive various degrees of protection from attacks on oil infrastructures. All terrorists must acquire income, buy arms, and achieve international recognition. They must find safe havens where they may escape and store arms and cash. “The countries of the Middle East have contributed most of the cash and arms that are given to the different terrorist groups and have ensured their growth.” Oil wealth finds its way to terrorists through a variety of practices: governmental corruption, contract offsets, bribes, blackmail, direct payments, indirect purchases, and any number of other ways. Terrorists realize oil monies are sponsoring many of their activities. The reason nation-states sponsor terrorism is not solely for protecting pipelines:
“Terrorism-sponsoring states have interests ranging from ideological and theological aspirations to pragmatic and practical strategic and economic goals. They commit to terrorism sponsorship to further these interests. States use terrorism in order to attain objectives they cannot and/or would not attain through regular and conventional instruments of international relations, from negotiations to economic disputes to waging major wars. And as the potential costs and price of war grows, so does the penchant to use terrorists in war-by-proxies in order to solve national problems and/or realize national aspirations through the use of force but without much of the risk entailed.”
Private oil companies are accused of yielding to demands for oil dollars to fund terrorists’ activities; therefore, retaliation is thought to be less likely against these companies that also have the further incentive of keeping governments from interfering with daily operations. The extent of this practice is unknown but is suspected in the Middle East because of the private/governmental ownership of companies supplying oil. Although strenuously denied in public, industry-related bribery by Western oil giants in major energy deals appears to be frequent. “Show me the money” is a major theme between Arab nations, big oil, and producers of terrorism.
Casualty Insurance. Pipelines are secure if they may be reconstructed rapidly. The speed of reconstruction increases rapidly if funds are available to repair damage to facilities. Governmental and private insurance agencies are in the business of covering risks to the Middle East oil infrastructure and providing the dollars to pay for reconstruction. An outstanding example of a governmental agency that underwrites damage done by political violence is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the United States.
The mission of OPIC is to facilitate the investment of private capital from the US to emerging markets as part of US foreign policy. It carries out this mission by selling political risk insurance and long-term financing to US businesses. It invests in projects in over 140 developing countries. OPIC claims to operate on a self-sustaining basis with no net cost to the taxpayer. Over its thirty-year history, OPIC has supported US$138-billion worth of investments. Interestingly, OPIC insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government. Oil and gas coverage is one of eight special insurance programs of the agency. Political violence coverage compensates for property and income losses caused by violence undertaken for political purposes.
OPIC also can provide financing for construction, ownership and operation of oil and gas pipeline, and other large and small energy and non-energy related projects. The Caspian Office of OPIC has facilitated development of energy projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan main export oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. To date, OPIC has provided more than US$2-billion in project finance and political risk insurance support in Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Oil companies with billions in net revenue and the assistance of OPIC, Export-Import Bank, and the US Trade and Development Agency are insulated in varying degrees from short-term and long-term destruction due to political violence. The terrorist’s events of September 11, 2001, did not deter oil firms from moving ahead with new construction. One energy analyst affirmed after the attacks, “They [terrorists] could delay (the projects), but in general, there’s no inclination to change their [international oil companies] investment outlook based on political changes.” A spokesman for BP said it was not scaling back on a US$15-billion natural gas project in Saudi Arabia’s South Ghawar region in partnership with ExxonMobil, Shell, and Phillips.
The resiliency of oil companies to move forward may also be seen in the action of shareholders of Shell Pakistan who three days after the terrorist attacks of September 11 approved investment of US$3-million in the Pak Arab Pipeline Co. which plans to build a US$480-million, 817-km pipeline oil pipeline that will carry five-million tons of oil a year from northern Pakistan. The managing director of Air Security International, a Houston-based security and intelligence firms, has confidently gone on record with the statement that radical fundamentalists who oppose oil companies being in their countries do not care what happens to these oil projects and international relationships.
Repair of Pipelines. The amount and timeliness of funds to repair broken pipelines and other facilities are not the only factors to consider in estimating the time when oil will again flow. Pipelines are constructed and maintained with only little regard to their vulnerability to terrorism, and they are vulnerable at several points. An estimate of the time to repair a US pipeline system, for example, gives some indication of the time required to repair the Middle East system.
“The time required to repair damage to any pipeline varies, depending on the size of the damage, its complexity, weather conditions during repair, required safety measures, and the availability of skilled repair crews. For example, damage to a Tapline [The Alaskan Pipeline System: TAPS] pump station could take nine months to fix. Some booster pumps are constructed to each system’s specifications and might require six months to a year to replace. Damage to pump stations or to the automated control facilities could result in as much as a one-third reduction in throughput.”
The TAPS is a four-foot pipe running 800 miles between Prudhoe Bay to Port Valdiz, Alaska. It is estimated that attacks along the pipeline would require over a year to clean up. On October 4, 2001 a single rifle bullet entered the Tapline near Livengood, Alaska. The “terrorist” was a single drunken hunter with a .338-caliber rifle. Pressure spewed 286,000 gallons of oil 75 feet into the air. The pipeline shut down for three days before workers of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. fixed the leak. Vulnerability to oil pipeline attack is reduced by having skilled repair and operating personnel and easily obtainable critical spare parts.
Worldwide data over a 10-year period shows that oil and gas pipelines are the fourth most popular energy targets for terrorists, but that damages are only temporary. Even with more than 150 attacks on the Cano-Limon Covenas pipeline in Colombia, terrorists were unable to seriously disrupt the energy supply. However, under certain conditions, damage can be significant and long-term. Multiple attacks on the Beira-Mutare pipeline in Zimbabwe were highly significant, because it was the sole conduit for refined petroleum products to Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Consequences to peoples of the two countries were compounded because of a stressed economy.
Terminals: Oil loading terminals in the Middle East, and by inference oil drilling platforms, are “sitting ducks” for an air attack. “The exposure of oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf suggests that the most effective way to cripple oil trade from the Middle East would be aerial attack on the principal oil ports and offshore loading terminals up and down the Gulf.” Terminal repairs range from upwards of one year or more. Pipelines may be repaired relatively quickly, but destruction of pumping stations could put the entire system out of action for weeks or months depending on the factors mentioned above.
Loss of oil supplies may be offset because of the ease of handling oil, the ability of producers and consumer states to swap oil, and the use of alternative pipelines. Loss of gas supplies is another matter. Reconnection and restoration of gas supply after a terrorist disruption is far more complex than for oil.
If the length of repair time on land is uppermost in a terrorist’s mind, would he/she select pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks, or oil terminals? Probably, none of the above, for if he/she has good, oil system intelligence he/she would more likely target key points in the electrical control systems for petroleum and water pumping stations. Such a choice and follow-through would affect most other facilities. The best way to cripple Hydrocarbon Man is to pull the plug on Kilowatt Man.